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Abstract:
The fifth generation wireless system (5G) is expected to handle an unpredictable number of het-
erogeneous connected devices and to guarantee at least the same level of security provided by
the contemporary wireless standards, including the Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA)
protocol. The current AKA protocol has not been designed to efficiently support a very large
number of devices. Hence, a new group-based AKA protocol is expected to be one of the security
enhancement introduced in 5G. In this paper, we advance the group-based AKA threat model,
reflecting previously neglected security risks. The threat model presented in the paper paves the
way for the design of more secure protocols.
1 INTRODUCTION
5G is the next generation of mobile networks
and will be a fundamental enabler in supporting
user experience continuity, mission critical ser-
vices, and Internet of Things (IoT) connectivity.
IoT poses important challenges for 5G, as the net-
work is required to support a great number of
heterogeneous devices. Furthermore, differently
from the traditional human-to-human scenario of
today networks, IoT is characterized by machine-
to-machine communications among devices with
limited CPU, memory, and power resources.
The technology behind 5G is not only ex-
pected to offer a reliable connectivity to the IoT
scenario, but also to support billion of devices
connected at the same time. This poses new secu-
rity challenges, such as authentication and data
protection of group of devices that request net-
work access simultaneously. The state-of-the-art
protocol for authentication and key agreement in
mobile telephony is the evolved packet system
AKA (EPS-AKA). Its design largely follows the
UMTS-AKA protocol, which was devised in the
late 90s and did not take in account the demands
of IoT market. Although the 3GPP consortium
has started to work on normative in support of
the IoT (3GPP, 2011), the specification of the
AKA protocol has almost remained the same for
the last 20 years.
According to current AKA specification, each
device should perform a full authentication pro-
cedure that involves both serving network (i.e.,
the local network that provides services to the
device) and device’s home network. When many
devices require access simultaneously, a situation
determined by the IoT scenario, the signaling be-
tween serving and home network represents a bot-
tleneck, which may decisively affect the promised
high speed of 5G. For this reason, a new group-
based AKA protocol has been identified as one
of the security enablers to be introduced in 5G
(Svensson et al., 2015). The goal of a group-based
AKA protocol is to reduce the signaling between
serving and home network when a group of many
devices require access at the same time.
Contribution. Recently, several group-based
AKA protocols have been proposed (Lai et al.,
2013; Cao et al., 2015; Choi et al., 2014). How-
ever, none of these proposals has taken into ac-
count or explicitly listed the new security threats
arising in a group-based authentication scenario.
Thus, the contribution of this paper is twofold: i)
it advances a threat model that extends the tra-
ditional threats concerning AKA with additional
threats for group-based AKA; ii) it analyses four
recent group-based AKA protocols in the pro-
posed threat model, and discusses the findings.
Outline. The paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 introduces the reader to the basics of
the AKA protocol. Section 3 motivates the need
of group-based AKA protocols and defines the
threat model. Section 4 describes the analysis
of four group-based AKA proposals and discusses
the results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 BACKGROUND
The goals of the AKA protocol are identifica-
tion of subscriber, mutual authentication between
the terminal and the serving network as well as
generation of a session master key agreed between
the terminal and the serving network. With a se-
curity take, the AKA protocol is strategical as
it bootstraps the security parameters needed to
form a security context that is agreed among the
parties. In this section, we provide an overview
of the current AKA protocol by shortly discussing
the different roles, security requirements, and the
protocol messages.
2.1 Roles
The terminology used in mobile telephony has
changed each time a new standard was released.
It happened with GSM, UMTS, and LTE. How-
ever, the set of tasks performed by each role has
not changed despite the different names. We re-
fer to the terminology adopted in LTE. The three
roles concerning AKA are as follows.
• The User Equipment UE role is the combina-
tion of the tasks of the terminal device and
USIM (or UICC). Each UE can be uniquely
identified by a permanent subscriber identity
(IMSI ). At time of subscription, the UE is
given a long-term secret key that is shared
with the authentication server. In this paper,
we use the term machine-type communication
MTC to refer to the UE. This term is more
appropriate in the context of 5G and IoT. In
fact, the 3GPP consortium released a specifi-
cation for MTC devices to enhance the LTE
suitability for the IoT market (3GPP, 2011).
• The Mobile Management Equipment MME
role concerns the tasks of covering the mo-
bility of the MTC. A specific MME serves an
MTC depending on the geographical area in
which the MTC is located. The MME is part
of the serving network, and we use both terms
interchangeably. In the context of AKA, the
MME authenticates the MTC when the lat-
ter wants to access the network. MME and
MTC agree on a session master key Kasme
from which they can derive further keys to
protect the signaling data.
• The Home Subscriber Server HSS is the au-
thentication server that assists the MME to
authenticate the MTC. The HSS knows the
MTC identity and its long-term secret key.
Moreover, HSS and MTC keep track of a
sequence number (SQN ) to support authen-
tication. The communication between HSS
and MME is normally secured with RADIUS
or more recently with Diameter protocols
(3GPP, 2008). As we shall see later, when an
MTC requests network access to the MME,
the latter forwards the request to the HSS,
which provides an authentication vector that
enables mutual authentication between MME
and MTC.
2.2 Security Requirements
The security requirements of AKA have histori-
cally concerned the authentication of the user and
the confidentiality of the session master key. In
the last release, also authentication of the serving
network has been considered, and more emphasis
on protection of MTC identity has been posed.
We briefly present the desired security require-
ments that an AKA protocol aims to achieve.
• MTC authentication: This requirement en-
sures that the MTC with the claimed identity
was involved in the AKA protocol run with
the MME.
• Serving network authentication: This require-
ment states that the MME with the claimed
identity was involved in the AKA protocol run
with the MTC, and that the HSS authorized
that MME to provide network access to the
MTC.
• Session master key confidentiality : This re-
quirement prescribes that the session master
key agreed between MTC, MME, and HSS is
known only to them.
• MTC identity privacy : This requirement en-
sures that only legitimate parties can learn in-
formation regarding the MTC identity from
messages occurring in an AKA protocol run.
UE/MTC MME HSS
Attach request
Auth. data req.
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Auth. data resp.
RAND, XRES,
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Figure 1: EPS-AKA message sequence chart
2.3 Overview of EPS-AKA
EPS-AKA is the last of the AKA protocol fam-
ily as it is the standard for LTE. The goals of
EPS-AKA match the security requirements out-
lined above. We give a high level description of
messages and actions of EPS-AKA (see Figure 1).
The protocol begins with the Attach request
message sent by the MTC to the MME. The mes-
sage includes the IMSI of the MTC, when the de-
vice visits the MME for the first time. If the MTC
has already visited the MME in the past, the mes-
sage contains the Global Unique Temporary Iden-
tity (GUTI), which was assigned to the MTC by
the MME in the previous visit. In doing so, the
MME can translate the GUTI in the correspond-
ing IMSI, and the privacy of the MTC can be
assured. Then, the MME forwards its identifier
(SNID) and the IMSI to the HSS in the Authenti-
cation data request message. The HSS generates
an authentication vector containing:
– A random value RAND that provides fresh-
ness of the session;
– an expected response XRES that is based on
RAND and long-term key.
– a session master key Kasme to achieve data
confidentiality in the signaling between MTC
and serving network;
– an authentication token AUTN that is based
on RAND, long-term key, and SQN. It allows
the MTC to authenticate the serving network.
The Authentication data response message con-
tains the generated authentication vector and is
transmitted to the MME. The MME forwards
RAND and AUTN to the MTC in the Authen-
tication request message. The MTC retrieves the
sequence number and checks if it matches a valid
one. If so, the serving network is authenticated.
The MTC computes the session master key and
the response RES, which based on its long-term
key and on the received RAND. It then sends the
response to the MME in the Authentication re-
sponse. If the received response RES corresponds
to the expected response XRES, the MME suc-
cessfully authenticates the MTC. From now on,
signaling between serving network and MTC can
be protected with keys derived from Kasme.
3 TOWARDS GROUP-BASED
AKA
We now investigate on how the AKA proce-
dure can benefit from a group-based approach.
A group is formed by one or more members
that share similar features. Examples of common
features include members that do the same task,
members located in the same geographical area,
or members that belong to the same owner. A
group may also share a macro feature that is de-
rived by a combination of single features. This
scenario is the natural consequence of combining
mobile communication and IoT. Thus, we shall
unfold two use cases in support of such scenario.
Marathon. Our first use case is a marathon
that gathers many participants who are equipped
with MTC devices. Such devices gather some
information, such as the position of the partic-
ipant, and continuously need to access the net-
work to upload the data. Entities in support of
the marathon may be equipped with such devices
as well. The devices should be able to continu-
ously communicate to a remote service, and at-
tach procedures can be executed simultaneously.
Hence, the signaling between MTC and MME,
and between MME and HSS may increase con-
siderably. Grouping such devices according loca-
tion and owner can reduce the signaling between
MME and HSS, at least regarding the authenti-
cation of the devices.
Monitoring of goods. Another use case that
may benefit from the presence of groups is the
monitoring of goods during shipment (Seitz et al.,
2016). Companies employ MTC sensors to mon-
itor altitude, temperature, humidity, climate, or
other environmental conditions of sensitive goods
such as perishable food. Thus, the MTC sensors
need network access to communicate with their
owner, who may collect sensors values at specific
times of the day. Additionally, a cargo container
may contain goods and MTC sensors of differ-
ent owners. Grouping the MTC sensor according
tasks and owners avoid burdening the HSS due to
the simultaneous authentication requests.
Therefore, the functional goal of a group-
based AKA protocol is to authenticate a group
of devices efficiently, minimizing the cost of re-
peated message exchanges and communication
delays. More specifically, a group-based AKA
protocol aims to reduce the signaling between
MME and HSS when a large group of MTC with
similar features requires network access simulta-
neously. While the literature has mainly focused
on the functional goals of group-based AKA, we
now concentrate on its security aspect.
Group-based authentication has seen several
definitions and different threat models. Martucci
et al. (Martucci et al., 2004) define group-based
authentication as the process of verifying whether
a device belongs or does not belong to a trusted
group, considering honest group members only.
Nguyen and Roscoe (Nguyen and Roscoe, 2006)
specify group-based authentication as the mutual
authentication of each member, with the main ap-
plication of establishing a commonly shared se-
cret key among the group members even in the
presence of corrupt participants. In the context
of AKA, we consider the following definition of
group-based MTC authentication.
• Group-based MTC authentication: This re-
quirement states that the MTC with the
claimed individual and group identities was
involved in the AKA message exchange with
the MME.
Group-based MTC authentication naturally
extends MTC authentication seen in section 2.2
with an explicit reference to the group identity.
Thus, a group-based AKA protocol should ensure
group-based MTC authentication and all the se-
curity requirements seen in section 2.2.
3.1 Threat Model
In the context of the AKA protocol, the threat
model has historically concerned an intruder who
wish to break subscriber’s authentication or de-
rive the session master key agreed between an
MTC and the MME. Threats concerning privacy
have been overlooked, and privacy issues emerged
in AKA implementations. In fact, EPS-AKA
is vulnerable to active attacks against the sub-
scriber identity. One well-known problem is that
the initial attach of the UE to the network re-
quires the IMSI to be transmitted in clear text.
Since the IMSI is unique for each subscriber,
its leakage leads to subscriber tracking attacks.
However, both UMTS and EPS AKA protocols
proved to protect the subscriber identity against
passive attacks if the MTC sends in the attach
request the temporal identity GUTI. Both pro-
tocols also meet authentication of the subscriber
and secrecy of the session key against active at-
tacks (3GPP, 2001; Zhang and Fang, 2005).
In the scenario of group-based AKA, the his-
torical threat model concerning the traditional
AKA should be extended with additional threats
stemmed from the group approach. A compre-
hensive list of such threats is outlined below.
• The intruder is authenticated as MTC by the
serving network.
This threat concerns the identification of
the MTC by the serving network and origi-
nates from the traditional AKA threat model.
The intruder may try to impersonate another
MTC to get access to the network. The serv-
ing network shall ensure that network access
is granted only to correctly identified MTC.
• The intruder is authenticated as serving net-
work by the MTC.
This threat also comes from the traditional
AKA threat model. It concerns the identifica-
tion of the serving network by the MTC. The
MTC shall access the network only through a
correctly identified serving network. A proto-
col that meets mutual authentication protects
against this threat and the previous one.
• The intruder derives the session master key
agreed between an MTC and the serving net-
work.
This threat concerns the secrecy of the session
master key, which should be known by MTC
and serving network only. It also originates
from the traditional AKA threat model.
• The intruder identifies and tracks an MTC.
This is a privacy threat that allows the in-
truder to learn the IMSI, and use it to track
the MTC via handover signaling messages.
EPS-AKA resists to this threat only if per-
petrated by a passive intruder.
• The intruder is authenticated as member of
the group by the serving network.
This is a novel threat introduced by the group
approach. It is similar to the first threat out-
lined in this list but with a subtle difference:
in this case the intruder does not need to im-
personate another MTC. In fact, it is suffice
to convince the serving network to be a mem-
ber of the group to get access to the network.
It follows that this threat must be addressed
with appropriate mechanisms.
• A corrupted member of the group is authenti-
cated as another member of the group by the
serving network.
So far the intruder has been considered as an
external entity. This novel threat involves an
intruder that is also member of the group,
namely it corrupts and has the total control
of an MTC. It signifies that this threat con-
siders a more powerful intruder with addi-
tional knowledge derived from being part of
the group. As the intruder may try to imper-
sonate another member of the group, the serv-
ing network shall correctly identify the MTC
before grant network access.
• A corrupted member of the group is authenti-
cated as serving network by the another mem-
ber of the group.
This threat also involves an intruder that is
part of the group. The goal of the intruder is
to impersonate the serving network when an
MTC, which is a member of the group as well,
seeks for network access.
• Colluding corrupted members of the group de-
rive the session master key agreed between a
third group member and the serving network.
This threat further extends the intruder ca-
pabilities with the ability to corrupt multiple
MTCs that are members of the group. The
intruder’s goal is to learn the session master
key agreed between the serving network and
a third MTC not controlled by the intruder.
• Colluding corrupted members of the group
identify and track a third group member.
This last threat concerns the privacy of the
group members. Again, the intruder might
control a number of corrupted MTC. The goal
of the intruder is to track an MTC that is not
under its control.
The list outlined above contains nine threats,
five of which are novel because the group ap-
proach. The new threats involve an intruder with
the ability to corrupt and control MTC that are
members of the group. It follows that no member
of the group should be trusted.
It appears to be challenging how to ensure pri-
vacy and authentication in presence of one or sev-
eral corrupted MTCs. The next section analyzes
the state-of-the-art group-based AKA proposals
to check how they address this issue.
4 SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze recently pro-
posed schemes for group-based AKA, and discuss
whether they are suitable candidate for 5G, given
the threat model.
4.1 Broustis et al. Schemes
Broustis et al. (Broustis et al., 2012) propose
three group-based AKA schemes that aim to i)
ensure the same security as in individual device
authentication, ii) protect against potential at-
tacks originated by corrupted members, and iii)
reduce the signaling as compared to individual
device authentication. The underlying idea is to
introduce a gateway that mediates between each
device and the MME, and to base group authen-
tication on global values that are valid for all de-
vices in the group, hence minimizing the tradi-
tional AKA signaling in favor of broadcast mes-
sages.
4.1.1 First Scheme
In the first scheme, a group key is shared between
the HSS and the gateway. The gateway knows
the group members and sends a group authenti-
cation request to the MME, which forwards the
request to the HSS. The HSS generates an aggre-
gated authentication vector that consists of the se-
quence of each device authentication vector with
the global values G RAND and G AUTN, which
are generated using the group key. However, the
HSS generates individual responses XRES, one
per device. The aggregated authentication vector
and the sequence of individual responses are sent
back to the MME. The MME forwards the aggre-
gated authentication vector to the gateway. The
gateway authenticates the serving network using
G AUTN and forwards the challenge G RAND
to the devices, each replying with their response
RES. The gateway forwards each response to the
MME, which can authenticate each device.
4.1.2 Second Scheme
In the second scheme, the group key is shared be-
tween each device and the HSS. The aggregated
authentication vector consists of the global val-
ues G RAND, G AUTN, and also G XRES, all
of them generated using the group key. Since the
gateway does not know the group key, it cannot
authenticate the serving network and has to for-
ward both G RAND and G AUTN to the devices.
Thus, each device can authenticate the serving
network and generate the same response G RES.
The gateway checks that each device has sent the
same G RES, and forwards the response to the
MME, which authenticates the group.
4.1.3 Third Scheme
The last scheme is similar to the second one with
the sole difference that the MME forwards to the
gateway G RAND, G AUTN, and also G XRES.
In doing so, the gateway can authenticate the
group of devices on behalf of the serving network,
hence it can reduce the signaling with the MME.
Discussion. All the proposed schemes reduce
the signaling because they use global values based
on a shared group key. However, the size of the
aggregated authentication vector increases as the
size of the group increases, affecting the band-
width requirements between HSS and MME. The
introduction of a new role as the gateway in the
AKA procedure is also critical because it requires
several changes at the architecture level.
We argue that each of the three different
schemes fails to provide an adequate level of se-
curity according to our threat model. In the
first scheme, mutual authentication cannot be
achieved because the authentication of the serv-
ing network for each device is done by the gate-
way, hence a corrupted gateway can successfully
impersonate as serving network to all the group
members. The second and third schemes fail to
meet the individual authentication of the devices:
the global G RES cannot be uniquely associated
to a member of the group. Thus, colluding cor-
rupted group members can successfully authenti-
cate a third member without its participation.
4.2 SE-AKA
Lai et al. (Lai et al., 2013) design a group-
based AKA protocol, called SE-AKA, for LTE
networks. The key idea of SE-AKA is to pro-
vide each member of the group with the same
group key but with different synchronization val-
ues. The synchronization values behave as se-
quence numbers for the synchronization between
each MTC and the serving network. The proto-
col adopts an asymmetric key cryptosystem sup-
ported by a PKI to allow the MTC to send their
IMSI encrypted to the serving network, and uses
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman to achieve key for-
ward and backward secrecy.
SE-AKA distinguishes two protocol proce-
dures. One procedure is the authentication of the
first group member that visits the serving net-
work. The other procedure regards the authenti-
cation of the remaining members. The message
flow occurring during the authentication of the
first member is similar to EPS-AKA. A major
difference is that the HSS sends to the MME the
authentication vector plus a list that contains all
the synchronization values of the group members.
In doing so, the MME will be able to run the AKA
procedure with the remaining members without
involving the HSS.
Discussion. SE-AKA observes the same roles
described in LTE and reduces the communica-
tion overhead between MME and HSS to only
one message exchange, independently on the size
of the group. However, it increases the size of
the authentication data response that the HSS
sends to the MME, because the message includes
also the list of synchronization values. The size
of the list depends on the size of the group, hence
the protocol may not be suitable for very large
groups. Also, low-end MTC may not be able to
support ECDH and asymmetric encryption.
As a general note, we observe that a poten-
tial security issue of SE-AKA is that the MME
is provided with more information than needed
in group-based AKA. Since the synchronization
values behave as sequence numbers, and the HSS
sends to the MME the list of synchronization val-
ues of all group members, the MME also obtains
data regarding MTC that eventually will not visit
that serving network.
The authors prove mutual authentication, ses-
sion master key confidentiality, and privacy of the
identifier in ProVerif. The proofs do not con-
sider an intruder able to corrupt members of the
group, as we advocate in the proposed threat
model. Since all the members of the group share
a single group key, and the AKA procedure to
authenticate the remaining group members does
not require the use of devices’ pre-shared keys, an
intruder that corrupts two MTCs can break au-
thentication by swapping the two synchronization
values assigned to the corrupted MTC.
4.3 Choi-Choi-Lee Scheme
Choi et al. (Choi et al., 2014) propose a new
group-based AKA protocol that uses symmetric
cryptography only. Their solution adopts an in-
verted hash tree (Page, 2009), in which each node
is associated to a secret value. The node value is
derived from the hashed value of the node’s par-
ent. Each MTC is assigned to a leaf node value
and is given a set of secret values. The set con-
tains all the secret values of the tree, except the
secret value assigned to the MTC and all the se-
cret values of its ancestor nodes. The MME is also
assigned to a leaf node value. The idea of using
an inverted hash tree is to allow each pair of MTC
and MME to agree on a session master key, which
is based on the common node values share by the
pair. The Choi-Choi-Lee protocol distinguishes
the role of leader among one of the members of
the group. The leader bootstraps the AKA proce-
dure and mediates as gateway between the MME
and the rest of the group. The message flow of the
Choi-Choi-Lee protocol is similar to the second
scheme proposed by Broustis et al. in section 4.1
with two main differences: i) in Choi-Choi-Lee,
the HSS generates a global authentication vec-
tor based on a group key that is shared with the
members of the groups, and ii) the responses RES
differ from MTC to MTC such that the leader
can generate a global response G RES by apply-
ing the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) on
the aggregated individual responses RES.
Discussion. The global authentication vector
reduces the bandwidth requirements between
HSS and MME, and the presence of the leader
minimizes the signaling between MTC and MME.
As in Broustis et al. schemes, the introduction of
a gateway may require additional changes to the
mobile telephony architecture.
Although a ProVerif analysis of the protocol
seems to confirm that it meets mutual authentica-
tion and confidentiality of the master session key,
we find that no property can be ensured against
an intruder that controls some members of the
group. The authentication of MME to MTC
can be broken because the MAC inside the au-
thentication vector is generated from the group
key shared between HSS and the members of the
group. Any corrupted MTC that is part of the
group can generate the MAC, hence they can im-
personate the MME to a third group member. A
second problem lies in the use of the inverted hash
tree for the generation of the master session keys.
Since each MTC knows all the node values but
ones of its ancestors, any two corrupted MTCs
with no common ancestor nodes, except the root,
can calculate the master session keys agreed be-
tween MME and any other group member. It
follows that the protocol does not meet confiden-
tiality of the master session key in presence of
corrupted group members. A last issue concerns
a denial of service attack related to the global
response G RES. The leader can correctly gener-
ate this value only if all the members of the group
provide the leader with their individual RES, oth-
erwise the CRT returns an incorrect G RES to
the MME, and no member can be authenticated.
Thus, it is suffice that one group member omits
its response RES to inhibit the authentication of
all the other members.
4.4 GBAAM
Cao et al. (Cao et al., 2015) advance a Group-
Based Access Authentication protocol for MTC
(GBAAM) based on pairing cryptography. The
idea is to use identity-based aggregate signatures
to reduce the signaling between MME and MTC
without affecting bandwidth requirements. The
protocol has two phases: registration and group-
based access authentication. At registration, each
MTC executes a classic AKA procedure at end
of which MTC, MME, and HSS agree on a long-
term private key. In the second phase, each MTC
generates the material to create a distinct master
session key and signs it with its long-term private
key. A leader collects the signatures received from
the members, aggregates them, and forwards the
aggregate signature to the MME. The MME gen-
erates the session keys and sends back a response
message signed with its public key.
Discussion. This protocol introduces the role
of the leader to reduce the signaling between
the group and the MME. The protocol benefits
from identity-based cryptography as it removes
the need of a PKI and enables the construction
of short yet secure aggregated signature. The pro-
tocol is formally analyzed by model checking in
TLA+/TLC against a Dolev-Yao intruder model,
but only two MTCs are considered in the secu-
rity analysis. Hence, the intruder cannot corrupt
multiple MTCs as prescribed in our threat model.
However, the major issue of the protocol is that
registration and group-based access authentica-
tion must be executed with the same MME. This
choice cancels the benefits provided by the group-
based approach because the required signaling be-
tween MME and HSS is the same as required in
traditional AKA. The devices normally require
to access the network in a different geographic
location than the location where they registered.
Moreover, the MTCs may be in different locations
when they registers to the group. This limits the
suitability of the protocol as group-based AKA.
5 CONCLUSION
This paper has described the threat model
that a secure group-based AKA protocol is ex-
pected to withstand. In particular, it has iden-
tified nine threats, five of which introduced by
the group approach. The analysis of four re-
cent group-based AKA protocols has reveled that
either they are not immune to the prescribed
threats or they fail to achieve the functional goal
of group-based AKA.
5G and Internet of Things represent the last
challenge about the convergence of mobile com-
munications and computing. 5G must be de-
signed to support the massive growth of IoT de-
vices with fast connections and without compro-
mising the overall security. The authentication of
group of devices is one the IoT-related use case
in 5G, and a secure group-based AKA protocol
is expected to be the next enhancement in mo-
bile telephony. Thus, this paper advocates the
proposed threat model and analysis as basis to
design the future 5G group-based AKA protocol.
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